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FAITH AND SILENCE IN PLAT01S GORGlAS 
ATHE CLIMAX of his dispute with Socrates over the nature of man Callicles refuses to go on answering Socrates's questions and stands silent while Socrates 
recapitulates and finishes the argument alone ( Gorgias, 506c-
509) . Throughout the rest of the dialogue Callicles remains 
recalcitrant, breaking his silence only to sneer at Socrates or 
continue perfunctorily a conversation in which he has obviously 
little interest. At first glance Callicles's silence seems to 
represent the stubborn embarrassment of a man who knows he 
is defeated, but is refusing to admit it. He had maintained the 
profligate's thesis that the good for man is identical with states 
of pleasure but has been led by Socrates to admit the need for 
self-control guided by knowledge of the difference between good 
and evil pleasures and pains (499b) . Now, with Callicles silent, 
and at the urging of Gorgias himself, Socrates goes on to com-
plete the argument by supplying the ultimate standard by 
which men are to distinguish good from evil pleasures and 
pains-the wisdom which has guided his every word in his three 
conversations with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles: "Wise men 
say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held 
together by the principles of sharing, by friendship and order, 
by self-control and justice,, (508} . But clearly this conclusion 
goes beyond the premise Callicles has agreed to; Callicles could 
grant the need for self-control while logically refusing to place 
it at the service of friendship, the particular standard an-
nounced by Socrates: the tyrant too knows self-discipline. This 
insight that Callicles stands on firm ground in his silence can 
help to interpret this dramatic incident in Plato's Gorgias. By 
making a point of Callicles's silence during Socrates's declara-
tion of his ultimate wisdom Plato provides, not a signal of 
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Callicles's defeat, but the appropriate counter-declaration of 
the tyrannical soul. 
To be sure, Callicles shifts his position during his conversa-
tion with Socrates, but his movement is steadily away from 
Socrates until in his silence he stands exposed as the exact op-
posite of Socrates. This movement occurs in three main steps 
as Socrates presses for clari£cation of Callicles's initial asser-
tion that" nature herself reveals it to be only just and proper 
that the better man should lord it over his inferior . . . the 
stronger over the weaker " ( 483d) . In the first step Socrates 
leads Callicles to dismiss as better or stronger the mass of men 
which has the actual physical strength of numbers ( 488c-489d) . 
Second, he leads Callicles to dismiss as better or stronger the 
fools and cowards whose desire is for mere]y bodily pleasure 
( 494b-499b) . It is at this point that Callicles admits the need 
!or self-control. The third and final step in Callicles's move-
TD.~nt of self-clarification is his silence itself: by the better, 
.'ltronger man Callicles means ultimately himself as opposed 
to all other men. His silence asserts his character itself, the un-
sharable truth, which he alone can fully understand and ap-
preciate, that he is the master and all other men his slaves. 
Callicles is the despotic soul whose portrait Plato draws so 
vividly too in the Republic, that .soul whose hitherto disparate 
appetites for fragmentary pleasures have come to be ruled by 
the " great winged drone," the insatiable master passion for 
power which takes as reality the lunatic's dream of lording it 
over all mankind and heaven besides (Republic, 572) . 
The clarification of Callicles as residing ultimately in the 
tacit commitment to his tyranny over others is to be contrasted 
with the movements of self-clarification undergone in Socrates's 
presence by the two previous speakers in the dialogue, Gorgias 
and Polus. For the main line of meaning in the dialogue runs 
from the opening question about who Gorgias is (447d) to 
the final revelation in Callicles's silence of the distorted depths 
of Gorgias's own soul. 
In the opening conversation Gorgias falls into a self-contra-
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diction when he both disclaims responsibility for the injustices 
of his students and yet claims that his students become just 
men in his presence (451h-461): he both does and does not 
make just men of those who come under his influence. This 
contradiction, which lies at the core of Gorgias's personality, 
rises to the surface under the pressure of the questioning 
presence of Socrates. In being ashamed to admit to Socrates 
that he is not an example of human excellence to his students 
Gorgias in effect confesses his own deeepest aspiration. In his 
shame in the presence of Socrates Gorgias has made contact 
with his own humanity, and now, while others speak he remains 
in the background following the argument intensely, so intense-
ly that he will urge Socrates to continue when Callicles falls 
silent. The event of " conversion" in the presence of Socrates 
is now repeated in the next conversation between Socrates and 
Gorgias's student Polus. 
Polus admires the tyrant, and in order to refute Socrates's 
contention that tyrants are unhappy and powerless because 
they cannot fulfill their own deepest desire to be just men he 
first cites historical cases of self-satisfied tyranny ( 470c-471d) 
and then invites Socrates to ask the opinions of those listening 
to their conversation ( 47Se) . Socrates, however, would pro-
duce but one witness to the truth, Polus himself (474), and 
he asks Polus whether it is uglier to do or to 5Uffer injustice 
(474b). Polus responds that doing injustice is uglier than 
suffering it, but, as Socrates helps him see, by ugly he really 
means evil, and so in fact he himself does agree with Socrates 
that tyrannical action contradicts a man's own good. In Polus's 
abrupt about-face we once again glimpse Socrates performing 
the eminently just action of education for which he was con-
demned. With his question as to whether doing or suffering 
injustice is uglier he has lilted Polus out of the context of 
mutual reprisal, where tyranny might be considered excusable 
as the fitting response forced upon one by the threats of others, 
and has placed before him the entire spectacle of mutual in-
vasion itself, asking him whether it suits his own aspiration for 
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fulfillment, whether Polus himself could initiate the violence. 
When Polus responds, face to face with Socrates, that to do so 
would be ugly he expresses the distance between himself and 
tyrannical self-assertion. Beneath his superficial admiration of 
the tyrant Polus is revulsed by tyrannical action. Socrates's 
questioning presence has touched this nerve of Polus's hu-
manity, as it had touched that of Gorgias before him, bringing 
him to life as a man. 
To be sure, we are not to make too much of Polus's conver-
sion. His tone throughout his conversation with Socrates in-
dicates clearly that he is well on the way toward becoming 
like Callicles, the next speaker, who will interpret Polus's ad-
mission that tyranny is ugly as influenced not by Polus's na-
ture but by convent ion (48~d). By bracketing Polus's ad-
mission between Gorgias's more positive eagerness to dissociate 
himself from injustice and Callides's more deadly silence Plato 
has both fixed Polus at the mid-point on a scale of growing in-
sensitivity to Socratic friendship and has suggested his move-
ment from Gorgias, the teacher, to Callicles, the thoroughly 
corrupt product of Gorgias's teaching. Polus's confrontation 
with Socrates jolts him off course only momentarily. Socrates 
too is on the way toward Callicles, the human type that will 
condemn him for corrupting the youth, and he has not enough 
time remaining to help Polus establish this newly awakened 
revulsion at evil as the ruling passion of his soul. 
The conversions undergone by both Gorgias and Polus in the 
presence of Socrates bring into sharp relief Plato's intention 
in having Callicles be silent during the speech in which Socrates 
links self-control to friendship. Face to face with Socrates, at 
the same point at which Gorgias was overcome with shame and 
Polus experienced revulsion at initiating the violence, Callicles 
remains rooted in that unregenerate commitment to tyrannical 
self-assertion for which silence is the appropriate expression. 
Callicles loves violating other men, loves tyranny for its own 
sake. Socrates had already recognized this loving commitment 
of Callicles's when in his first speech to Callicles he stressed 
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that both of them are lovers, he of wisdom, Callicles of power 
(481c). And now, in Callicles's silence during Socrates's dec-
laration of friendship, Socrates cannot but hear Callicles's 
counter-declaration that self-controlled dedication to principle 
is as much a part of the life of tyranny as of the life of friend-
ship. In Callicles's silence Socrates's self-disciplined friendship 
confronts an equally self-disciplined, unyielding, love of tyran-
nical power, Plato pours into his construction of this confronta-
tion his own recognition of the purity, the spirituality if you 
will, of the love of tyranical power, which is in every way the 
matching opposite of the Socratic love of friendship. 
This suggestion that Callicles and Socrates are spiritual coun-
terparts implies that in the conversation between them every 
key concept-nature, convention, freedom, power, happiness, 
justice, friendship, speech, etc.-has an opposite meaning de-
pending upon whether Socrates or Callicles defines it. But in 
the remarks that follow I will seek to secure, not the opposite 
meanings of each of these specific concepts, but rather the gen-
eral framework which contains them all, the spirituality 
Socrates and Callicles have in common, as well as the point at 
which they come into opposition. To this end it will be helpful 
to characterize briefly the human condition which elicits from 
both the fundamentally human spiritual response. 
Socrates and Callicles have in common what all men have 
in common by virtue of the human condition itself, namely, the 
issue of staying in contact with the truth of the world. That 
a man's fundamental issue is contact with the truth of the world 
is strikingly expressed by Plato himself in his fable of the hu-
man puppets in the Laws (644d) : The situation of every man 
is that of a puppet whose opposed interior states pull him 
like cords toward opposite actions, the gentle tug of the golden 
cord of judgment toward citizenship, the violent, iron-like tugs 
of private pleasure and pain toward self-assertion. For our 
present purpose the importance of Plato's image of the puppets 
lies not in its location of every man between citizenship and 
self-assertion, but in its poignant depiction of every man's situa-
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tion of being open to a world whose ultimate meaning is un-
known: like puppets we lack the puppet master's knowledge 
of the meaning of the show. Sensing that something is at stake 
in our lives but uncertain as to what it is, we do not know how 
to perform so as not to spoil the play. It is this specifically hu-
man condition of ignorance about the meaning of the whole 
which places every man in the distinctively spiritual issue of 
locating and maintaining contact with the truth which governs, 
not just this or that part of the world, but the world entire. 
For within the ignorance of the ultimate meaning of the world 
there lurks the horror of unattunement with the world, the 
horror of doing what violates the truth of the world or what 
is trivial, accidental, passing, as against what is substantial or 
enduring because it is the ultimate meaning, or purpose, which 
holds sway throughout the world itself. This horror of un-
attunement with the world can be dispelled only by the belief 
that one is performing in one's every action the ultimate task 
which the world itseli essentially is and which all things in the 
world are called to enact so that, as in a well-formed play, every 
part achieves in the manner appropriate to it the proper at-
tunement of all to all. In such perfectly attuned action, which 
is the spiritual goal that the human condition of ignorance sets 
before every man, a man would be alive in the properly human 
essence: that of himself which should rule his life would be 
actually ruling that of himself which should be subordinate, 
and he would be the rightly ordered place through which the 
work of the world is done as it ought to be done by a man in 
the world. Here a man would be representative of all mankind 
in the sense of a revelation to all men of the meaning of being 
human in the world. And now, Plato would have us under-
stand, I believe, that both Socrates and Callicles are men of 
such spiritual commitment, men whose self-discipline stems 
ultimately from the effort to maintain and represent man's 
proper attunement to the world. By letting Callicles be silent 
during Socrates's statement of his wisdom, and by doing so 
against the background of the contrasting assent by Gorgias 
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and P olus to the spiritual force of Socrates's personality~ Plato 
effectively suggests that Socrates and Callicles are two equally 
fo rceful spiritual claims to be the model or representative man 
whom all other men are to pattern themselves upon in order 
to come alive in their properly human nature and stand in the 
truth of the world. 
But, while Socrates and Callicles are equally spiritual through 
their common concern to be the properly ordered, representa-
tively human place through which the truth of the world flows 
among men, this truth itself differs radically in each case. For 
Socrates "heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together 
by the principles of sharing, by friendship and order, by self-
control and justice." And, in the face of Callicles's silence, he 
goes on: " that, my friend, is the reason wise men call the 
universe cosmos, and not disorder or licentiousness." The 
wholeness of the universe of existing things, the ground which 
is itself no existent thing among others but which embracingly 
binds all existent things into a whole, is the event of friendship, 
the event of each thing being most itself by drawing the others 
into their proper pa1·tnership in the whole, their capacity to 
create the whole by evoking this capacity in still others, so that 
all things are engaged in mutually eliciting, or enlivening, each 
other's capacity to form a whole in which all co-exist as part-
ners in simultaneous fulfillment. Just as the gods, the powers 
of nature, form the immortal natural cosmos by mutually 
evoking each other's partnership in the whole, so too men are 
to form the city in the image of this natural cosmos by mutual-
ly evoking each other's power to be citizens. And, as we have 
glimpsed in Socrates's encounters with Gorgias and Polus, 
Socrates himself is the place where this essence of the world oc-
curs among men: Socrates fulfills himself by drawing from 
Gorgias and Polus their own capacity to fulfill themselves in 
community with Socrates. Such educative friendship is Soc-
rates's very attunement to the essence of the universe. Who 
he is is the true statesman (5!21d), the human image of the 
ground, the unbiased meeting point wherein all things can in-
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tersect as mutually fulfilling, intercommunicating partners in 
the creation of a self-enlivening public order. His life is this 
event of evoking in others the moral agency which is their own 
capacity to create and maintain the city, i.e., evoke it in still 
others. Such friendship, the mutual creation of the city in time 
in the image of Socrates, who images the gods, who image the 
eternal ground, is truly human life. And in this context 
Callicles's silent, self-assertive rebellion against the divine in 
man is a living human death. 
For Callicles, on the other hand, the universe of existent 
things is essentially disorder, strife, the war of everything 
against every other thing in which each thing's unsharable ful-
fillment-mastery-is each other thing's unfuliillment-slavery. 
To be sure, from within Callicle.s's own private, egoistic perspec-
tive, all things appea.r as facets of an ordered whole: each thing 
is an instrument for furthering his own mastery over others. 
But when Callicles universalizes this egoism, attributing it to 
all, he must find between himse]f and others, not Socrates's self-
enlivening community, but rather the precisely opposite event 
of an explosion into nothing, each part's tyranny over the others 
eliciting, as in the game of hands upon hands, the other's 
tyranny over it-a mutually heightening fragmentation whose 
outer limit is the chaos of part outside part outside part. In 
this Calliclesian universe Socratic friendship is seen as merely 
a surface phenomenon, at best our unstable contract to use 
each other for the time against a common enemy, be it physical 
nature or a group of still other men. The last word of all friend-
ship, however, is Callicles's own silence, the mute, self-disci-
plined violation of each other which enacts, in the image of 
Callicles himself, the truth of the world that mind succumbs to 
the divisive onslaught of blind, silent matter. 
Thus, as Callicles and Socrates stand facing each other, 
Callicles silent, Socrates declaring the truth of frendship, each 
is accusing the other of having "turned human life completely 
upside down" (481b); each is the spiritual appeal to the other 
to awaken from dream and come alive in genuinely human at-
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tunement to the real world. Moreover, as Plato's image of the 
puppets suggests, this issue between Socrates and Callicles is 
the issue of every man. Each of us may experience the issue 
in that moment of confrontation with the other man when we 
stand at once in the centripetal current which would absorb 
him into ourselves without remainder and the centrifugal cur-
rent which would sweep us toward him in friendship. In this 
moment we know the opposed Calliclesian and Socratic ten-
sions of our own soul and have ourselves as actors in the drama 
of war and peace. 
But perhaps-and I suggest this last point with hesitation 
because Socrates seems so confident of his .. arguments of 
adamant and steel" (509) -perhaps Plato has packed into this 
incident in the Gorgias the still deeper meaning that in fact 
Socrates does not know with certainty that he, not Callicles, 
represents human nature. For Callicles's silence occurs against 
the background of Socrates's earlier remark, made at the be-
ginning of their conversation, that Callicles will be his touch-
stone, that if Socrates can bring Callicles to agree with him 
then Socrates will know that his own soul is golden (486e). 
Against this background Callicles's silence may represent the 
counter-wisdom which Socrates fails to break, a failure which 
exposes Plato's awareness of the crisis of faith which lies at 
the core of his philosophy. Though Socrates-Plato's wisdom 
rests firmly upon his own experiential self-knowledge of the 
hierarchical order of rank of the powers of his own soul (his 
conscience), it remains ultimately an act of faith made in the 
face of the opposite possibility attested by Callicles-Plato in his 
silence. After all, all knowledge waits upon confirmation from 
the other's point of view, and this is especially the case for philos-
ophy which seeks that wisdom about the whole which includes 
the phenomena of human valuation itself. Here the testimony 
of the other is especially crucial. What a man alone sees he 
must doubt; he approaches certainty only if others can see it 
too. Thus, only in dialogue can there be established the nature 
of man as our clue to the nature of the universe, and in this 
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dialogue Calliclesian silence, whether it stares back at one from 
the other or surfaces in one's own soul, has a say. Hence the 
power of Socrate.s's confrontation with Callicles's silence at 
Gorgias 506c: the two opposed tugs in every man's soul off-
set each other, generating every man's deepest question; 
Socrates is present as Plato's answer to this question, but this 
answer requires a confirmation it does not receive. The reader 
must himself enter into the dialogue about the nature of man. 
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